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A three-stage partial equilibrium oligopoly model is studied 
in order to investigate the strategic effects of profit-sharing in 
an industry. In the first stage, firms propose a profit-sharing 
contract to their workers. In the second stage, the workers accept 
or refuse the proposed contract. There is an exogenously given 
market wage, and the traditional wage system is implemented in the 
firm if the contract is rejected by its workers. The last stage is 
a standard Cournot oligopoly. It is shown that perfect equilibria 
of this game involve profit-sharing on the part of all firms. A 
single firm always has incentives to adopt a profit-sharing scheme 
if its competitors pay their workers according to the usual wage 























































































































































































In the recent years, there has been some debate concerning 
Martin Weitzman's (1983, 1985, 1987) claim that a 'profit-sharing' 
or 'share' economy has a better macroeconomic performance than a 
standard 'wage-economy', especially with respect to employment 
levels (see for example Nordhaus (1988), Nuti (1987)).
A number of authors have discussed the problem in purely mac­
roeconomic terms. On the other hand, the idea that profit-sharing 
schemes might constitute a good internal incentive system for the 
firm has been studied further, but from the point of view of lab­
our economics, organization and management theory. By contrast, we 
focus here on a much less studied topic: the relationships between 
profit-sharing and the behaviour of an oligopolistic market. More 
specifically, profit-sharing will be viewed here as an additional 
strategic tool in the process of imperfect competition. In what 
follows, the scope of the analysis is that of the industry. This 
approach seems to be relevant to the task of providing firm micro- 
economic foundations for Weitzman's proposals.
In the context of a simple general equilibrium model with im­
perfect competition and downwardly rigid nominal wages, Weitzman 
has shown that the introduction of profit-sharing increases aggre­
gate labour demand and thus reduces unemployment. Since new hir­
ings always cause a decline in workers' per capita income under 
profit-sharing contracts, a shift from the wage system to the 
'share' system will be Pareto-improving only if the induced macro- 
economic feed-back effects on the level of the firms' demand func­
tions are taken into consideration. Weitzman thus claims that such 
an improvement will be achieved if a share contract is adopted by 
a sufficiently large proportion of the firms in the economy.
These ideas have been attacked using partial equilibrium mic­
roeconomic reasoning. Since workers would resist a decline of 
their income levels, it has been argued that a monopolistic firm 
must guarantee a per capita compensation at least as great as the 





























































































cannot be increased, and the firm has no incentive to propose a 
profit-sharing contract to its employees.
However, it can be shown that tax incentives can be profitably 
introduced to encourage profit sharing in Weitzman's macro model 
(e.g. Zylberberg (1988)), but Wadhwani (1988) argues that they 
could easily be misused and dissipated, since firms and unions 
would have an incentive to construct a merely 'cosmetic' scheme.
These negative results and the subsequent discussion on the 
appropriateness of public intervention have been developed in the 
framework of a simple model with a single monopolist. In the fol­
lowing, our goal is to discuss these problems in a model which 
allows for explicit consideration of the strategic interdependence 
of firms.
In the context of a Cournot oligopoly model, we show that a 
firm always has an incentive to introduce profit-related pay uni­
laterally, even if subject to the constraint that workers will 
reject any contract yielding less than the prevailing market wage 
at the (Cournot) equilibrium. Furthermore, the adoption of a 
profit-sharing scheme by each firm in the industry constitutes a 
non-cooperative equilibrium.
These results have strong implications. They clearly say that 
public intervention is not necessary in order to trigger the in­
troduction of share systems.
The closely related idea that contracts can be used as a means 
of strategic commitment, or the more general idea that the organ­
ization of product markets is not independent of the strategy used 
by firms on the labour and input markets have been expressed and 
studied in some recent papers (for example: Aghion and Bolton 
(1987), Dewatripont (1987, 1988), Dixit (1982), Stewart (1987)). 
We provide here a completely rigorous derivation of the above- 





























































































In the model's first stage, firms propose a profit-sharing 
contract to their workers (or to the workers' union). In the 
second stage, the workers accept or refuse the proposed contract. 
There is an exogenously given market wage, and the traditional 
wage system is implemented in the firm if its workers refuse the 
contract. This amounts to assuming that a firm can always hire its 
work-force at the prevailing wage rate. The last stage is a Cour­
not oligopoly with standard properties. The game's second stage 
can easily be disposed of, since workers will simply reject any 
contract leading to an equilibrium for which their payoff is less 
than the market wage. Instead of explicitly modelling this second 
stage, we substitute an equivalent "individual rationality" con­
straint, imposing bounds on the firm's first-stage choice of a 
contract. To summarize this discussion, in the following model 
firms choose a profit-sharing scheme subject to the constraint 
that the induced last-stage Cournot equilibrium profits will be 
sufficient to pay at least the market wage to the workers.
It turns out that this game has the structure of a 'Prisoner's 
Dilemma'. If all firms pay their workers according to the wage 
system, a single firm's best response is always to adopt some 
profit-sharing contract. Therefore, the traditional wage system 
cannot be a perfect equilibrium of this game. Any perfect equilib­
rium of the game involves profit sharing on the part of all firms. 
In this latter situation, profit levels are shown to be less than 
the case in which each firm uses the wage system.
In addition, the employment level increases and the equilib­
rium market price decreases in the profit-sharing perfect equilib­
rium, as compared to the traditional wage-system oligopoly out­
come.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, the model is 
described and a few technical lemmata are stated. Section 3 exam­
ines individual incentives to adopt profit sharing in the indus­
try. Finally, perfect equilibria in contracts are studied in Sec­





























































































Consider an industry comprising n identical firms indexed by 
i = 1, ..., n. Let w > 0 be the prevailing market wage (an exo­
genous parameter here). Let be the quantity produced by firm
i. Firms produce a single homogeneous good whose price is given 
by an inverse demand function P. Define q as the n-tuple of 
firms' decisions q = (q^ . .., qn) and further define Q as 
Q = y.q.. It must be understood that q. > 0. Labour is the sole 
input of the industry and there are constant returns to scale: one 
unit of labour gives one unit of product in each firm. Each firm 
i may choose a profit-sharing scheme, or 'contract', which can be 
formally represented as a couple of real numbers (cr, 6^), firm 
i's profit function being defined as:
Il^q, o^, 8^ = (1 - ai)(P(Q) - Si)qi
and workers' per capita income being defined as:
t(q, ai , B±) = «i (P (Q ) - + 8r
Clearly, the wage system is a particular contract obtained when 
(a^, B̂ ) = (o, w). In the following, for all i, we restrict 
(a^, 8^) to lie in the set [o, l)x£o, w] . Clearly, is a
share and belongs to [0, 1), and 8^ must be interpreted as a 
base wage. Negative values of 8̂  would thus be meaningless. 
Finally, no interesting aspect of the problem is lost by restrict­
ing 8^ to remaining below w.
Let a = (dj, ..., an) and 8 = (B^ ..., Bn). We define the 
subgame T(a, 8) as the n-person Cournot oligopoly obtained for 
fixed (a, 8). The pay-off for each firm i is n.(q, a- 6;)
1 1  f 1
and q^ is firm i's strategic variable.





























































































(Al) P : R++ -*■ R+; PeCk (R++), k > 2; P'(Q) < 0 if P(Q) > 0;
w < lig^jjP(Q) and Xig^QP(Q)Q = 0.
(A2) There exists Qq > 0 such that P(Q) = 0 for all Q > QQ 
and P (Q) > 0 for all Q < QQ.
(A3) For all q, q° > 0 such that 0 < q + q° < QQ> if P(q°+q) +
qP'(q°+q) > 0, then P'(q°+q) + qP"(q°+q) < 0.
The first two assumptions do not need any comment. Only A3 
deserves our attention. It is slightly stronger than the strict 
quasi-concavity of n. with respect to q, . Note that strict
1 1 o 0quasi-concavity of IL is characterized by: P(q +q) + qP'(q +q)
= Bi implies 2P'(q°+q) + qP"(q0+q) < o.
We now state a few preliminary results which ensure that the 
equilibria of r(a, B) are well-behaved in the relevant domain. 
All the proofs are in the Appendix.
Lemma 1 (Existence of subgame equilibria)
Under A1-A3, for all (a, B) e [0, l)n x[0, w]n, T(a, B)
possesses a Cournot-Nash equilibrium.
It is clear that the equilibria of T(a, B) do not depend on 
a < 1. Let q(B) = (q^(B)» — » qn(B)) denote an equilibrium,































































































Under A1-A3, if 6 = (b, b, b), be^O, w], then qx(B) =
q2(0) = ... = qn(8) > 0. Any diagonal set of base wage parameters 
leads to a symmetric and interior equilibrium of T(a, 6) for all 
ae[0, l)n .
Lemma 3 (Global Uniqueness)
Under A1-A3, for all Sep), w]n , interior equilibria of T(a, B) 
are globally unique.
For all values of the parameter 8 for which an interior
equilibrium of T(o, B) exists, we denote q(8) this unique 
equilibrium. In addition:
Lemma 4 (Comparative Statics)
Under A1-A3, if q(B) is interior, then 8 •* q (8) is a C1 func­
tion on a neighbourhood of 8 and
3q.(8) nP'(Q)+Q_iP"(Q)
qii = T ê T  = P ’(Q)l(n+l)P,(Q)+QP"(Q)J < 0;
aqA(B) - (P'(Q)+qiP"(Q))
qij = “36^ P'(Q)l(n+l)P'(Q)+QP"(Q)J ÿ 0 lfl ^
0 , = 30(B) = _____ , P'(Q)___________ < o-
ui 3Bi P'(QH(n+l)P'(Q)+QP"(Q)J
where Q = Q(B) and Q_i = Q(8) - q^B) for all i.
In addition, Q| - q ^  > 0.





























































































We consider here the following problem. Given that all firms 
other than firm 1 pay their workers according to the wage system 
(i.e.: (or, B )̂ = (0, w) for all i = 2, n), does there ex­
ist a non-trivial (i.e. (ot1, 8-̂ ) / (0, w)) profit-sharing con­
tract such that both firm 1 and its employees are better off in 
Cournot equilibrium? In other words, would an oligopolist firm 
unilaterally adopt some profit-sharing scheme subject to the con­
straint that a worker's contractual payment must be greater than 
w? A positive answer is provided here.
Define qs(b) = q(b, b, ..., b) for all be^O, w}. To sim-g 0plify notation, n^(q (w), 0, w) is simply denoted n (w).
Definition 3-1. A contract (a, 8)e£0, l)x[0, w] is implement- 
able by firm 1 if and only if for all Cournot equilibria q of
3. Individual Firms’ Incentives to Adopt a Profit-sharing Scheme
r(a, 0, .. *, 0 ; B, w, ..., w) one has
(S) t(q, a, B) > w
(F) n^q, a. B) > n°(w).
Let C denote the set of implementable contracts
Definition 3-2. A contract (a, B) eC is Pareto-improving if and 
only if (S) and/or (F) in Definition 3-1 are satisfied as 
strict inequalities.
Then we have: 
Lemma 5
Under A1-A3,
(i) (0, w) eC;
(<*f 8)eC and a = 0 implies B = w;
(ii) (01/ 8)eC implies T(a, 0, ..., 0, B,




























































































(iii) C is compact (in R2).
In other words, the set of implementable contracts is non­
empty and no implementable contract can deter the entry of any 
firm which pays its workers according to the wage system. Thus, 
the implementable set of contracts leads to subgames which possess 
a unique interior equilibrium.
Note however that entry deterrence would be possible if poten­
tial entrants (say the firms i = 2, ..., n) had sufficiently 
high fixed costs.
It is now possible to study the existence of a Pareto-improv- 
ing contract in the sense of Definition 3-2.
Define the functions s and f as follows. For every Be[0,
w] ,
S(B) = lPlQ(8, £  w)J - Bj £ [°' ^
f(B) = 1 (. P C Q ( B, w, ..., w ) jW— B Jq1( B, w..... w) e C°' 1J'
where Q (B, w, . . . ,  w) = q± < 6, q, w) .
With these definitions (a, B)eC is equivalent to ae[o, 1), 
Be[0, w] and s(B) < a < f(B).
These functions are well-defined, since (a, 8)eC implies 
q(B, w, ..., w) >> 0 and p (Q(B, w , ..., w)) > w B- Lemmata 3 
and 4 thus show that q(*) is continuously differentiable when 
(a, 8)eC. It follows that s and f are differentiable.
Theorem 1: Under A1-A3, if n > 1, there exists a contract (aB, 
B ) which is Pareto-improving (in the sense of Definition 3-2). 




























































































Before the proof of Theorem 1, it is useful to show why the 
result is not true in the case of a monopoly (i.e.: n = 1). Sup­
pose that there exists a Pareto-improving contract (a, 6)# then
(F) (1 - o)(P(q1(8))-B)q1(B) > n°(w) and
(S) a(p(qi<B))-B) > (w - B)
with at least one strict inequality.
Multiplying (S) by q^tB) > 0 and adding (S) to (F)
yields
(B)) - w) qx(B) > n°(w) = ni(q1(w), 0, w),
but by definition of q. (w) (the monopolist's output at w) one 
has
n°(w) > (P(q) - w) q for all q > 0.
In particular, this last inequality is true for q = qx(B), a 
contradiction.
Proof of Theorem 1:
First note that if there exists a 8^ such that s(B°) < f(8°), 
then C has a non-empty interior. Consider $(6) = f(B) - s (B)-
To prove the existence of such a 8̂ *, it is sufficient to show 
that when B° is close to w, with B° < w , one has $(S^) > 0.
To shorten notation, we write everywhere q(B) instead of 
q(B, w, ..., w) and so on. Define p(B) = P(Q(B)) and ir(B) = 
(p(B) - B)qx(B). Then, simple algebra yields
«(B) = -MB)"1 (n( B) - n°(w) - (w-B)qx(8)),
and differentiation with respect to B yields:




























































































Since it(w) = n°(w) and $(w) =0, at B = w, this expression 
reduces to $'(w) = it(w ) 1 (q^fw) + u'(w)), and
ir'(8) = (P'(Q(B)) Q 1 ( B) - l) q1(B) + (p(B) - 8) q^tB).
First-order necessary conditions for profit maximization give 
(p(w)-w) = -q^w) P'[Q(w)).
Substituting this latter equation in the expression for n'(w) 
yields:
tt'Jw ) = -q^ (w) + P 1(Q(w) ) q1(w)(Q^(w) - q-j^tw))
and
$'(w) = tt(w ) 1 P'(Q(w)) qx(w) (Q|(w) - q^lw)).
Using then the results of Lemma 4 and P' < 0 shows that 
4'(w) < 0. Since *(w) = 0, there exists 6 > 0, such that 8° 
< w and w-8° < 5 implies 4(6°) > 0. Q.E.D.
- insert here Fig. 1 -
Corollary: There exists an optimal (profit-maximizing) contract 
for the firm, which strictly improves the firm's profits, and 
under the conditions of which the firm's employees exactly receive 
the market wage in oligopoly equilibrium. Formally, there exists
(a0, 8^)eC such that ni (q(8, w, ..., w) , a, 8) is maximized at
(a0, 8°) subject to (a, 6)eC. Moreover, t(q(B°, w, ..., w).
a°, 8°) = w and nx(q (8°, w, . . 0.. , w), a , 8°) > H°(w).
Proof: Since C is compact and IÎ is continuous with respect 
to (a, B), the optimal contract exists. Theorem 1 shows that 
firm 1 can do strictly better than nu(w). Finally, a standard 

























































































































































































Some comments are in order. First of all, note that the wage 
system is not a perfect equilibrium of our multi-stage game, since 
firm l's best response to the wage system is to introduce some 
profit-sharing contract. Clearly, in this multi-stage framework, 
the adoption of a contract is a commitment which creates a strat­
egic advantage in the last-stage Cournot oligopoly. By means of 
such a contract, firm 1 can increase its market share and its pro­
fits at the expense of its rivals. If contracts are to be viewed 
as a strategic commitment device, one would then wish to study the 
problem of their optimality. In other words, does there exist an 
optimal general compensation scheme t, such that at the equilib­
rium of the subgame induced by the choice of t, one has both t >, 
w and n^ft) > ni(q(B, w, ..., w), a, B) for all (a, B)eC? It 
would then be a nice result if the linear two-parameter schemes 
studied here were undominated in the above sense. Unfortunately, 
this is not true. In the case of a linear inverse demand, it is 
possible to show that there exist quadratic reward schemes which 
are better for firm 1 than any simple profit-sharing system (a, 
6) .
In more general cases, it might happen that the optimal scheme 
of firm 1 is a corner solution (i.e.: B° = 0). This means that 
relaxing the constraints imposed on the class of admissible com­
pensation functions t would allow for an increment of firm l's 



























































































4. Subqame-Perfect Nash Equilibria in Contracts
We consider now the complete game in which each firm i 
chooses a contract (c^, B^)- Firms then compete through the 
choice of profit-sharing schemes, knowing that it affects their 
strategic power in the second-stage Cournot oligopoly. We study 
here the properties of such a 'subgame-perfect equilibrium in 
contracts'. It is particularly striking that the strategic choice 
of profit-sharing versus the wage system has the structure of a 
Prisoner's Dilemma.
* *
Definition 4-1. A perfect equilibrium is a 2n-tuple (a , B ) = 
((or, 8^)i=1 n) such that for all i
t (q (B*), a*, 8*) > w, (or, B^) e [0, l) x [o, w]
and
(l-a?)(P(Q(B*))-B^)qi(B*) > (1-cr) (P[Q( B ^  bV  ) )-Bj_ )qA ( Bi, B^) 
for all (or, B^Je^, 1) x [o, w] such that 
t(q(Bi, B^), or, Bi) > w.
Under A1-A3, one proves the following Theorem.
Theorem 2: If (a, B) is a perfect equilibrium, then
(i) 0 < or < 1 and 8̂  < w for all i;
(ii) the equilibrium is symmetric (i.e.: or = or and B^ = Bj 
for all (i, j));
(iii) t(q(B), o^, Bi) = w.
(For Proof, see the Appendix.)
According to the statement of Theorem 2, if an equilibrium in 




























































































part of all firms. Note that it is not possible to prove (without 
adding assumptions to A1-A3) that any perfect equilibrium satis­
fies 8̂  > 0  for all i. It might be the case that firms would
like to implement negative values of 8. This leads to a true 
difficulty, both technical and conceptual. On the one hand, this 
fact jeopardizes the existence of an equilibrium in contracts. On 
the other hand, if 8̂  is to be regarded as a base wage, negative 
values of this parameter are meaningless.
The existence problem is discussed further below. It is anyway 
possible to state:
k k r\Theorem 3: If (a , B ) is a perfect equilibrium, then for all
i
ni(q(B*), a*, 8*) < n°(w) and Q(8*) > Q(w).
The equilibrium contract is Pareto-dominated (among firms) by the 
wage system (0, w)n.
Proof of Theorem 3: We establish first that the quantities prod­
uced at any potential equilibrium decrease when 8 increases. By 
Theorem 2, an equilibrium is symmetric. For a given 8, clearly
P '(nqs(8))qS(8) + P(nqs<8)) - 8 = 0  (1)
and by A3, applying the implicit function theorem:
= ((n+l) P '(nqS) + nqSP"(nqS))_1 < 0. (2)
Define ns(a, 8) = (1-a)(P(nqs(8)) - 8) qS(8). The proof of Theo­
rem 2 shows that t(nqs (8), a, 6) = w, so that
a = (w- 8) (P (nqs ( 8)) - 8 ] ~1 •
Define then




























































































Differentiation with respect to 8 yields:
Substituting (1) in (3) yields:





We have thus shown that if a perfect equilibrium exists, it 
yields smaller profits than the wage system (0, w)n . But the 
wage system is not a perfect equilibrium, as shown by Theorem 1. 
For some (a0, 8°)e(0, l)x£o, w), one has
ni(q(8*), a*, 8*) < n°(w) < IlJqfS0, w, ..., w), a0, 8°),
★ ic nwhere (a , 8 ) is a perfect equilibrium. In this sense, the
strategic problem of profit-sharing has the same structure as that 
of the Prisoner's Dilemma.
This in turn has some strong implications. If the game under 
study is repeated, then the Folk Theorem says that there exist 
non-cooperative (inter-temporal) strategies which support the wage 
system as a Nash equilibrium.
Thus, if one believes in the story told here, one should ob­
serve, initially, pioneering firms adopting profit-sharing schemes 
in a given industry. This first stage would be followed by a 
period of adjustment, during which all firms would progressively 





























































































Finally, firms would discover the advantages of cooperation 
with their rivals and revert to the wage system, under some equi­
librium with tacit collusion. Since employment unambiguously in­
creases (and any reasonable welfare function also does) when 
profit-sharing rules are adopted, there is here scope for state 
intervention. It is also worth noting that if a single firm is 
forced to implement profit-sharing, it is in the interest of 
others to do the same.
We close this section with a 
of perfect equilibrium in the 
some comments.
Theorem 4: If P{Q) = max {0, b
perfect equilibrium in contracts
(i) if w/b < (n-l)/n(n+l),
*  *B = 0  and a = w(n+l)/b;
(ii) if w/b > (n-l)/n(n+l)
large enough), the solution
* n-1a = --- -► 1 as n -*■ + ■»n
„* (n2+n)w-b(n-1)B = J---- Ly— 5---L ■* w as
(n +1)
result to do with the existence 
standard linear case, followed by
aQ) with b > w, there exists a
k k r* (a , B ) and
one has a corner solution with
(which is always true if n is 
is interior and given by
Proof : (Direct Computation)
In order to illustrate the results of Theorem 4 in a simple
k k
case, assume that n = 2 and b = 3w. Then, a = 1/2 and 8 =
(3/5)w. This numerical example shows that the magnitudes of pro­
fit-sharing and base-wage reduction are high in a concentrated 
industry's perfect equilibrium.
*  *But, as soon as n = 10, one has a = 9/10 and B = (4/5)w 
and when n = 100, one almost reaches the perfectly competitive 




























































































case, a is very high because profits are very low and 3 is 
approximately equal to the market wage w.
It is also interesting to compute firm l's best response to 
the other firms' choosing the wage system in the linear case. Let 
(a°(w), B°(w)) denote this best response, then
fiO(w) = liL-llb
a°(w) w - 8 (w) n-1
p(B°(w), w, ..., w) - 8°(w) n
so that if n = 2, B°(w) = w/2 with b = 3w and a0 = 1/2, and
if n = 10, B°(w) = w/10 and a0 = 9/10!
But the most dramatic changes happen when all firms imitate
■k \kfirm 1 and play their perfect equilibrium contract (a , B ). The 
percentage of profit reduction when one shifts from a situation in 
which only firm 1 uses profit-sharing to the perfect equilibrum 
can be easily computed as
1^(0°, 8°) - n{a*, B*) (n2-i)2
---------- '--- ’-------  = - 2 5 pn'
so that p2 = 36% and p^g = 96%! The percentage of profit re­
duction obtained while shifting from the wage system to the per­
fect equilibrium is given by
n°(w) - n(g*, B*) _ , _ n(n+l)2 _ .
0 ± 2 2 ~ °n'n (w) (n +1)
so that 62« 28% and 61Q = 88%. Finally, it is also worth com­
paring profit levels under the wage system with the levels reached 
by firm 1 after an optimal deviation from (0, w) to (a^(w), 
BU(w)). Simple computations show that
1 ^ ( 0  , B ) -  H (w) 































































































It is then striking to see that the 'incentives' to deviate from 
the wage system strongly increase with n. For instance, y 2 = 
11%, y4 = 36%, y6 “ 50%, Yg ~ 60%, and y10 - 66%! This is due 
to the fact that as n increases, the market becomes very compet­
itive and, therefore, n°(w) converges quickly towards zero while 
a slight marginal cost advantage is able to create considerable 





























































































Our main idea has been to stress the interpretation of compen­
sation systems different from the classical wage system as strat­
egic tools in the process of (imperfect) competition. It seems 
generally true that the wage system (which is a particular case of 
a constant compensation scheme) is not the best contract a firm 
can propose to its employees if this contract plays the role of a 
commitment creating a strategic advantage. In the context of a 
Cournot oligopoly, profit-sharing a la Weitzman has been proved to 
create such an advantage and to be involved in any (one-shot) non- 
cooperative equilibrium in contracts. Since an application of the 
'Folk Theorem' to the infinitely repeated version of the two-stage 
oligopoly studied above has the wage system as a subgame-perfect 
equilibrium, the usual conclusions concerning state intervention 
to encourage profit-sharing must be somewhat modified.
In the case of a Cournot oligopoly, it is not necessary to 
create tax incentives in order to trigger the adoption of profit- 
related pay. Public intervention should simply try to forbid the 
collusion of firms, to avoid complete reversion to the wage system 
once profit-sharing has been introduced. Some empirical facts seem 
to indicate that the role of many producers' federations is much 
more to organize negotiations with the workers' unions and to per­
mit firms to reach an agreement on some common wage policy more 
easily than to implement quotas of production, or to collude in 
the usual sense of the term on the output market.
Finally, our results clearly apply to multinational oligopol­
ies. In this case, collusion is much more difficult. It is thus 
not absurd to think that some Japanese firms gained a strategic 
advantage over their European or North-American rivals, among 
other reasons because they had developed profit-related pay, and 





























































































Proof of Lemma 1: By A2, Q > Q0 implies P(Q) = 0, and 0 < Q0
implies P(Q) > 0. Therefore, firms will never choose a product­
ion level greater than or equal to Qq. Define the best response 
correspondence of any firm i using (ou, B^):
BR (Q.) = {q.e[0, Q 1 | (PtQ.+q,)"B;^  >
(PIQ-i+qi) - Bihi for all q£e[o, Qq] }.
Since [0, Q ] is compact, since (P(Q_£+q|)-B^)q[ is continuous 
on Jo, Q 1 (Al) and strictly quasi-concave with respect to qj
(A3), standard arguments ensure that BR„ (Q_.) is a well-defined
**i
continuous function of Q. For all Be[0, w] and all qeR+, let 
us define
n
BR (q) = n BR (Q.),
0 i=l °i
where Q_i = ^^^q^ for all i. BRg maps [o, Qq] n into 
itself. Thus, by Brouwer's Theorem, there exists a fixed point q 
= BRg(q ). This fixed point is a Cournot equilibrium of T(a, B) 
for all (a, B)e[0, l)nx[o, w]n. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 2: Let B = (b, b, ..., b) and let q(8) be an
equilibrium of T(a, 8). Suppose that q^fB) = 0. Then, neces­
sarily, P(Q(8)) <, b and IL(q(8), ou, b) = 0 for all i. Define 
P(0) = ^  P(Q). If P(Q(B)) < b, then q±(B) = 0 for all i, 
but P(Q (6)) = P(0) < b <, w contradicts Al. If P(Q(B)) = b, then 
q^(B) > 0 for some i and choosing e such that 0 < e < q^(8), 
one finds (p (Q(B)-e)~b)(q^(B)-e) >0, a contradiction. Thus, if 
B = (b, b, ..., b) is a diagonal parameter value, any equilibrium 
of T(a, B) must satisfy q^(B) > 0 for all i. It follows from 




























































































be written P(Q) + q.P'(Q) = Si for all i, Q = Q (B)- Subtract­
ing these equations for i and j f- i, one finds (q|-qj)P'(Q) = 0, 
which implies q^ = q^ for all (i, j). Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 3: Let q be an interior equilibrium of T(a, B) • 
Then, P(Q) + q^P'IQ) = B| for all i.
Summing these relations over i gives
P(Q) + (Q/n)P'(Q) = {l/n)li&i > 0.
Thus, by A3
P’ (Q) + (Q/n)P"(Q) < 0.
Define
g(Q) = nP(Q) + QP'(Q) - B|.
1 2  1 1 If q and q ^ q are two interior equilibria at 8 and Q
2and Q are the corresponding total productions, then one has
Q1 / Q2, g l Q1 ) = g ( Q2 ) = o and g ' ( Q k ) < 0 ,  k = 1 ,  2 .
Since g is C1, it would be easy to show that this implies the
existence of a third equilibrium Q3 such that
g(Q3) = 0 and g *(Q3) > 0,
which is impossible. Therefore, all interior Nash equilibria at 8
have the same total production Q(8). It follows from this that
q|(B) is also uniquely determined by





























































































Proof of Lemma 4: It is sufficient to apply the Implicit Function 
Theorem. Let ¥: R^+ x^O, w]n -*• Rn be defined as ¥ = (¥1# . .., 
¥ ) and ¥. (q, B) = P(Q ) + q ^ M Q )  “ Bi* Then, q is an inter­
ior equilibrium at B if and only if ¥(q , 8) = 0, since by A3, 
first-order conditions are also sufficient. If D^¥ is regular at 
the equilibrium point, then
( I f )  ■ M ' 1 -
Let J¥ denote the Jacobian determinant of Dg¥. Differentiating 
the first-order conditions with respect to q gives:
J¥
2P,+q1P" P+q^P" ... P1+q1P" 
P +q2P" 2P+q2P" ... P'+q2P"
P'+q P" P'+q P"... 2P'+q P" 
subtracting the last column from the others yields:
P' 0 ... 0 P'+q^"
0 P' ... 0 P'+q2P"
J¥ =
0 0  P' P'+q ,P"n—1
-P'-P' ...-P' 2P'+qnP"
and adding the (n-1) first rows to the last one yields:
P'O ... 0 P' + q^P' 
0 P'.. . 0 P' + q2P"
... P' P'+q .P" n—1
... 0 (n+l)P'+QP"






























































































Clearly, by A3, J¥ f 0 and the Implicit Function Theorem can be 
. 8q.
applied. Let -.3 be the matrix (-r-g-̂ 1. . where i is the rowdo "p j 1,]
index and j is the column index. Then (3q./3B.) is easily 
computed as the cofactor of D T 's i-th diagonal term (i.e.: the 
minor obtained by deleting the i-th row and the i-th column of
J¥), divided by J¥. This minor has exactly the same structure
as jy and one easily finds
3q. (nP'+Q .P")(P')n_2__1 _ 1 _ V
3Bi ( (n+l)P'+QP")[P' )n_1 ' -1
which gives the result and is- negative by A3 and since P 1 < 0. 
Cumbersome algebraic computations of the same type yield the re­
sult for (3qi/3Bj), j / i. Since nP(Q) + QP'(Q) = ^ 8 ^  using 
A3 again, one easily obtains
f§ 7 = ((n+l)P'(Q) + QP"(Q))-1 = J.j$7 < °- 
Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 5: Point (i) is obvious. To prove (ii) assume
that for some equilibrium q, q. = 0, i / 1. Then, since (S)
is satisfied by (a, B), P(Q) < w < t(q,■ a, B). But these in-
equalities implie 
n P(Q)-t(q, a , 8)<0, that is. n1(q, a, B) < 0.Thus, since II (w) > 0, condition (F) is violated, a contra­
diction. If = 0, then P < 6 < w, and for any firm i / 1,
it follows that = 0 and Q = 0. Since by Al, lim^QP(Q) =
P(0) > w one again finds a contradiction. Thus, (a, 8)eC and q 
is an equilibrium of T(a, 0, ... 0, 6, w, ..., w) imply that q 
is interior. By Lemma 3, q is unique and q = q(B, w, ..., w).
To prove point (iii), it is sufficient to prove that C is
k kclosed, since C is clearly bounded. Let (a , B )eC be a con­
verging sequence. Let (a, B) be its limit. First note that (1, 
B) does not belong to C for all 8e[0, w] since n°(w) > 0.
Assume that a = 1. Since by Lemma 4, q(B, w, ..., w) is con­
tinuous, II^qlB14, w, ..., w), ak, Bk) < (l-ak)M (where M is




























































































sufficiently large k. Moreover, by continuity of q, t and n^, 
conditions (S) and (F) are satisfied at (a, 8)- Q.E.D.
Proof of Theorem 2: Note first that if (a, 8) is a perfect
equilibrium, then P > w > 8^ (where P = P(Q(8))). Suppose that 
P < w, then by Al, Q > 0. Thus, there exists i such that q^ 
> 0 and ni < 0, a contradiction. If P = w, then again Q > 0
and there exists i such that q^ > 0 and IK = 0. But one 
again reaches a contradiction, since by choosing to produce (q^ - 
£), e > 0, firm i could increase its profits.
Proof of (i)
To prove (i) assume first that or = 0 for some i. The wage 
constraint then trivially implies 8̂  = w. Since we then have a 
corner solution, the Kuhn-Tucker necessary conditions for firm 
i's profit maximization are as follows:
(P-S^U.-q.) < 0 (1)
(l-ai)((P,Q'-l)qi+(P-Bi)q!i)+Xi(ai(P'Q!-l)+l) = ir
Ui > 0 and = 0; (2)
li(ai(P-Bi) + Bi-w) =0, \i > 0; (3)
where and jr are Lagrange multipliers. The use of derivat­
ives is justified here, since P > w > 8^ for all i and P > 6^ 
implies q^ > 0 (see Lemma 4). These conditions reduce to
X. < q^ since P > w = 8̂  (1')
<P'Q!-l)q. + (P-w)q!. + Xt > 0 (2*' )
since or = 0. Adding qj - 1  > 0 to (2') yields




























































































But first-order conditions for a subgame interior equilibrium im- 
plie -P'q^ = P-w, and substituting this in (2") yields
(P'qiMQj-q-i) > 0.
This is a contradiction, since the results of Lemma 4 implie Q| > 
q!.. Finally, assume B̂  = w. Firm i's best choice is then 
clearly to set = 0, subject to the wage constraint. This con­
tradicts the above result.
Proof of (ii) and (iii)
To prove (ii) and (iii), assume 0 > > 1 and B̂  < w for all
i. The Kuhn-Tucker necessary conditions (1) and (2) are trans­
formed into
(P-Bi)(Xi-qi) = 0, (4)
(l-ai)((P’Q|-l)qi + (P-Bilq^) + X. (a. (P 'Q !-1) +l) =
Hi > o, uiBi = 0. (5)
Since P > w > B^ for all i, (4) implies X^ = q^ > 0 and (3) 
thus implies cr(P-B^) + B̂  = w. This proves (iii). Expression 
(5) can then be rewritten as
P'Qlq. + (P-w)q!i <0, (51 )
since
(l-o^HP-Bj) = (P-w) and Xx = q ^
Substituting the expressions for Q| and q| given by Lemma 4 in 
(5') gives




























































































where Q  ̂ = Q-q^. If Bj > 0 for some j, (5") must be satis­
fied as an equality (Uj = 0).
Assume that there exists (i, j) with Bj > B' > 0. Then
(P ’)2qj + (P-w)(nP1 + Q_jP") = 0, (6)
and subtracting (6) from (5") yields
C(P*)2 - P"(P-w))(qi-qj) < o, (7)
because (Q_^-Q_j) = (qj-q^). The first-order conditions for an 
interior subgame equilibrium are P + q^P' = 8^, k = i, j. By 
subtraction again, one finds
(qi-qj)P' = (B-Bj) < 0,
so that (q^—qj) > 0. Expression (7) then implies 
(P ’)2 - P"(P-w) < 0 and 0 < (P ’)2 < P"(P-w).
Thus, (6) implies
(P-w)P"(qj+Q_j) + (P-w)nP1 > 0,
and since P > w, this last inequality reduces to QP" + nP' £ 0,
which contradicts A3.
Finally, it has been proved that
B = Bi = By  a = oi = a.. = (w-8)/(P-B), and
qt = qj = qs(B)
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